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Abstract: 
One of the most fundamental components to be considered in implementation of good corporate 
governance is the establishment of effective corporate hierarchy. The purposes of this study are to 
find out the effect of corporate governance structure on information asymmetry, the effect of 
corporate governance structure on disclosure, and the effect of disclosure on information asymmetry 
in Indonesia banking industry. lbis study applies explanatory research with partial least square! 
variance based statistical method. The result implied that when corporate governance structure 
applied properly than the level of disclosure raised. The increasing of disclosure has mitigated 
information asymmetry in Indonesia banking industry. These results were greatly valuable to the 
investors for their investment decition making as well as to external parties. 
Keywords: information asymmetry, disclosure, ownership, corporate governance 
Introduction 
The influence of growing globalization massively impact on investment. Investors 
need to be convinced that the company where they invested has a standard corporate 
management and a good reporting standard also the correct implementation and monitoring 
in order to provide a return as expected by them. Transmission of relevant information on 
the actual events to the involved various parties in the organization (stakeholders) is very 
important in order to avoid information asymmetry. The collapse of Emon, Worldcom and 
some other global as well as local cases has proven the importance of the high quality of 
information in the company among stakeholders. Disclosure of information is a 
fundamental principle in the system of good governance in the company, namely 
transparency. With a good corporate governance, it is expected that disclosure of relevant 
information will increase and will decrease the information asymmetry, especially among 
agent and principal. 
Agency theory states that the agency relationship arises when one person or more 
(principals) employs another person (the agent) to provide a service and then delegate 
decision-making authority to agent. In the management of the company, often there is a 
separation between ownership and control between the owner as a principal and manager as 
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agent. Agency relationship is a contract in which one or more principal (owners) uses 
another person as agent (manager) to carry out the activities of the company (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). The agency problem often occurs in managerial is "empire building" which 
refers to the tendency of managers to run the company beyond their optimal authority or to 
utilize/use resources in order to increase private utilities, power, compensation, and to 
increase their prestige (Jensen 1986). 
The contractual relationship between the vanous parties (stakeholders) in the 
company always happens in the business. And it is very possible impending problems, 
which is often called the agency problem, because of the diverse interests and because it 
allows the asymmetry information. In many cases, confidence in the management and 
reporting of the company was eroded. An increasing number of scandals or problems and 
the failure of companies to encourage the importance of implementing good corporate 
governance. The code of ethics is necessary, good governance approach will require the 
development of corporate performance comprehensively at all levels including revealing 
events (financial and non-financial) incurred so that the information received by the 
different parties are the same information or relatively similar. 
In practice, disclosure can have a positive impact (gain) as well as negative 
(harmful). Disclosure can be used to convey the company's prospects in the future to 
shareholders but may decrease the competitive advantage of a company (Darrough, 1993). 
Disclosure in the investment world can act as public relations for the company associated 
with the investment community at any time, so through the public disclosure, investors 
know the existence of a company and reduces the risk of litigation costs for the company, 
but on the other hand there are costs to be incurred to make the disclosure, while those who 
take advantage of the disclosure typically do not want to pay because they assume that the 
company's fmancial statements are public goods (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). Disclosure 
may reduce the cost of equity capital. Disclosure can reduce information asymmetries in the 
capital market, and decreasing asymmetric information will directly reduce the cost of 
equity capital (Botosan, 1997). Also that disclosure can improve the use of financial 
intermediation services, such as securities analysts services (Dahlan, 2003). The above 
descriptions explained that the study about disclosure becomes very important to do further. 
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Research Questions 
Based on the above descriptions and bsackground, the research questions for this 
study are: 
1. Is there any significant effect of corporate governance structure on information 
asymmetry in Indonesia banking industry? 
2. Is there any significant effect of corporate governance structure on disclosure in 
Indonesia banking industry? 
3. Is there any significant effect of disclosure on information asymmetry in Indonesia 
banking industry? 
Method of Study and Data 
The method described in this study is descriptive. Variables are identified, 
population and sample are the entire Indonesia bank companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Datas taken from published audited financial statements by an independent 
auditor for corporate governance variable structure, bloomberg bank data for information 
asymmetry and for disclosure. All datas are for the period of 31 December 2001 to 2012. 
This study use partial least square regression approach (PLS) path analysis gives more 
opeuness in providing data processing requirements in the sense that the terms classical 
assumptions and certain distributions as ordinary least squares approach is no longer needed 
(Latan and Ghozali 2012, Jogianto 2009). A description of the operational variables of the 
study can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Description of Operational Variables 
Variables: Definition: Type 
of 
data: 
Corporate Governance Structure: 
• Managerial ownership The percentage of the number of shares in the company Ratio 
owned by managers, directors, and commissioners of all the 
outstandin~ share. 
• Institutional ownership The percentage of shares owned by all the institutions of the Ratio 
company's shareholders of all the outstanding share capital. 
• Audit committee ember The number of audit committee members in the company. Ratio 
• Board independen Number of independent board members divided by all Ratio 
members of the commissioner. 
Diclosure: 
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• Corporate governance Total score of items disclosed by the company I the Ratio 
disclosure maximum score that should be disclosed by the company 
(!pCG). 
Information Asymmetry: 
• Volume of transaction The number of shares traded on a particular day. Ratio 
• Bid-ask spread The average percentage of the daily bid-ask spread (the Ratio 
number of trading days) for each type of share studied during 
the observation period. 
Basic of Theory and Hypothesis 
Agency relationship defmed as a contractual in which one or more persons engage 
someone else to do something on behalf of those who delegated the authority for decision-
making to the agent. Both sides have a relationship of utility maximization and the agent 
will not always act at the best interest of principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
In a contracting schematic of the modem corporation describes the relationship of 
each parties in the company, and the relationship between the parties describes the 
contractual relationship that allow for asymmetry information and can eventually lead to a 
conflict of interest resulting agency problems. Potential conflicts of interest abound, even in 
a group of owners or shareholders itself (Fred, 2003). Developed corporate governance is as 
a system which directs all activities within the company can run properly in the interests of 
stakeholders. 
Good Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance concerns with the relationship between the management, 
board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Australian Security Exchange states, Good Coorporate Governance as a system used to 
direct and manage the activities of the company. Corporate governance also have an 
influence in order to achieve optimal performance, to analyze and control the risks facing by 
the company (ASX, 2005). Corporate governance is a system in which companies are 
directed and controlled, it also provides the structure that leads to the company's goals are 
already set, and the means to achieve those objectives and monitoring performance 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, 2004). 
In relation with the presence of board members, then the implementation of 
corporate governance is often linked to the size of the board, in some circmnstances the 
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board can be too small or too large, too small board member will lack of expertise or human 
power to run the company productively. While greater size will increase more skill and 
resources availabllity in the company's management (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Goodstein 
at al., 1994). Study also found that a company with a larger board members will be better 
(Adams and Mehran 2005), despite another fmding said that a small board would be more 
effective (Yerrnack 1996). However, that too large board size may not be efficient in 
making and implementing decisions, and also can be a waste of resources and reduces the 
productivity of individual. 
Another view in respect to board members said that an effective board should be 
balanced both within the company and outside the company. This ensures that the board 
remains independent and objective, maximizing the ability to make the best decision for the 
benefit of the corporation. It is expected that they will provide an independent assessment 
and monitoring for the better company's performance and that will raise the standard of 
corporate governance, yet said that board independent has positif relationship with corporate 
value (Weisbach 1988; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Brickley at. al., 1994; Core at al., 1999). 
Disclosure 
Management as a party to carry out company operational tasks has an obligation to 
meet the interests of shareholders, but on the other hand the management also have an 
interest to maximize their welfare. The difference of interests between parties that control 
company (management as an agent) with the shareholders (principal) would cause a conflict 
of interest (agency conflict). Agent who has more information about the current conditions 
and future plan of the company will not provide all the information to principal for various 
reasons such as cost constraints, a presentation of the report, and the desire to avoid the risk 
of visible weakness. On the other hand, principals need all the relevant information about 
the overall condition of the company, but do not have full access to the company internal 
information, it raises the asymmetry of information. Seeing the importance of information to 
minimize the asymmetry of information, disclosure of fmancial and non financial 
information is required. 
Disclosure of financial statements is a way to convey the information contained in 
the fmancial statements, which when talking about full disclosure principles that where 
management requires the disclosure of all the circumstances and events in the company that 
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makes a difference for users of financial statements in making decisions (Hendriksen at al., 
2002). Disclosure comprise of two types, namely: mandatory disclosure, it is the disclosure 
that must be presented by companies, especially for public companies. while voluntary 
disclosure is disclosure provided by the company outside of the items that are required to be 
drilled. This disclose is the informations given to public about either fmancial or non-
fmancial regarding the firm's operations without any legal requirement (Dahlan, 2003). 
Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a condition where there is an imbalance information 
between management as an information provider (preparer), with the shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Or a situation where there is inequality of information (both in qnantity and in 
quality) owned between one party to another party. it is more often concerned that the 
information held by management as an agent is more complete than the information held by 
the shareholders (Ujiyantho, 2003; Muller, 2007). Therefore, as an agent it is their 
obligation to pass information about the current condition and the future plan of the 
company to the owner, those informations as signal, which can be done through disclosure 
of financial information (such as fmancial statements) and even non-financial (eq. the 
change ofleadership of the company). 
Agent in a position has more information capacity, the working environment and the 
company as a whole compared with the principal. Assmning that individuals act to 
maximize self-interest, then with its asymmetry of information will encourage agents to 
conceal some principal's unknown information. Asymmetry between management (agent) 
and the owner (principal) give an opportuuity for managers to act opportunistically and 
unfavorable for the principals. 
Corporate Governance and Disclosure 
The main purpose of disclosure is to present necessary information in order to 
achieve the purpose of reporting, to serve the various parties who have interests that differ 
from one another. From the point of financial statements, the disclosure shall include the 
components of the financial statements, notes to the financial statements and supplementary 
information. 
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Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms that are built to provide protection 
for the stakeholders, including the minority party in the company (outside inverstors and 
minority shareholders) from misuse of information delivery conducted by the managers as 
agent and the controlling shareholders (insiders). For companies that implement good 
corporate governance should adopt the principles of transparency, which in the sense of 
providing information to various parties in a timely, accurate, clear, comparable, adequate 
and easily accessible by the user. 
From another side, the application of corporate governance must provide appropriate 
incentives for management and board in order to achieve the interests of the company and 
shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. An effective corporate governance 
system in the companies and the economy as a whole will help provide a level of trust that is 
needed for a functioning of market economy. Good corporate governance mechanism can 
increase the level of disclosure in the company and the level of confidence in investing 
(Zaluki and Russin, 2009; Wijaya, 2009; Susiyani, 2009). 
Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry 
In order to reduce management actions that are beneficial for him! her-self then it is 
important to implement corporate governance, which include controls and good procedures 
to ensure that management actions are in accordance with the interests of shareholders. 
Corporate governance mechanism can also affect the information disclosed by management 
to the shareholders. The implementation of proper corporate governance mechanism makes 
the management less likely acts in the interests of their own, further also will be able to 
disclose relevant information and avoid delivery of inferior information to shareholders. 
Quality of information increased after implementation of the corporate governance 
code code (Machuga and Teitel 2007). Companies that face the information asymmetry will 
tend to use less intensive monitoring board and will be more lean onl believe in the market 
discipline and CEO incentive compensation (Cai at al., 2008). 
In the previous study indicated when the board act more effectively in monitoring 
will improve the quality and frequency of information released by management. the 
publication or issuance of such information does not only include the actual reported 
earnings, but also in the form of voluntary disclosures such as management estimates and 
other information release. Further shown, in addition to reducing the accuracy of personal 
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information with the accuracy of public information, the disclosure will also reduce the cost 
to search information. This suggests that the existance of information asynunetry will be 
lower in the company whose board members work effectively. 
Table 2. 
Studies Associated witb Corporate Governance, Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 
N Resean:her, Title Finding (0) 
0 (Year) 
A Comorate Governance and Disclosure: 
I Zaluki and Corporate Governance and the Effective corporate governance positively related on 
Hussin, (2009) Quality of Financial Information financial disclosure, it was seen from the accuracy of 
Disclosure theIPO. 
2 Wijaya, (2009) Keberadaan Corporate Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Distress has 
dan Kondisi Financial Distressed significan impact on disclosure level. 
terbadau Voluntary Disclosure 
3 Anyta, (2011) Analisis Pengaruh Mekanisme Public ownership has a significant positive effect on 
Corporate Governance voluntary corporate disclosure (while institutional 
Terhadap Voluntary Corporate ownership, the proportion of independent directors 
and independent audit committee showed no Governance Disclosure 
significant effect on voluntary corporate disclosure) 
4 Susiyani, Hubungan Corporate Governance Corporate governance indeks has a positive 
(2009) dan Pengungkapan significant effect on disclosure index. 
lnformasi Pada Perusshaan yang 
Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
Tahun2001·2007: pengujian Secara 
Simultan 
5 Tsamenyi at. Disclosure and Corporate In the developing countries (including Ghana), the 
aI., (2007) Governance in Developing level of disclosure is low. ownership structure, dispersion of shareholding, and finn size has a 
Countries: Evidence from Ghana significant impact on disclosure. 
6 Okeahalam, Corporate Governance and It was characterized by extensive corporate 
Charles C. Disclosure in Africa: Issues and (financial) sector failure in South-East Asia. Those 
(2004) Challenges failures clearly because of the lack disclosures and 
corporate governance. 
Corporate governance and disclosure has a strong 
relatiouship. 
7 RichaId Pike, Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Results of the analysis based on the three measures of 
I.L.and Corporate intellectual capital disclosure indicate significant 
Haniffa, R. Governance Structure in UK Firms. association with all the governance factors except for (2008). role duality. 
8 Ahoagye- Corporate Governance and Although there has been improvement of disclosure 
Otehere at ai, Disclosure Practices of Ghanaian practices over the years, the level of disclosure in 
(2012). Listed Companies Ghana was still in moderate. There was a positive 
relationship between the presence of accounting! 
finance expert(s) on the audit committee and 
corporate disclosure practices. 
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B CO!l!!!.rate Governance and lnfpnnation 4n!mm~: 
I Kanagaretnam Does Good Corporate Governance Good corporate governance mitigates information 
at ai., (2007) Reduce Infonnation Asymmetry asymme1Iy during quarterly earnings announcements. 
Around Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements? 
2 Cormier at aI., Corporate Governance and Formal monituring (size board and committee size) 
(2010) Information Asymme1Iy Between and the level of voluntary governance disclosure can 
Managers and Investors reduce information 
3 Klein, (2002) Audit Committee, Board of Director An effective job of monitoring management 
Characteristics, and Earnings conducted by board will increase the quality and 
Management frequency of information released by management, 
reducing the information as 
4 TaIjo, (2010) Mekanisme Tata Kelola Korporat: Corporate governance mechanisms will reduce the 
Mampukab Menurunkan Cost of information asymme1Iy between managers and 
Equity Capital? owners. Thus the risks of investing in the company is 
decreased for corporate securities. 
C Disclosure and Infgrmation A!l!!!m~: 
I Leuz and The Economic Consequences of The company's commitment to increase the level of 
Verreccbia, Increased Disclosure disclosure will reduce information asymmetry 
(2000) component 
2 Cormier at aI., Board of Directors Characteristics, Governance disclosure 
(2008) Governance Disclosure and 
contnbutes to reduce the stock market asymmetry Information Asymme1Iy between particularly in the legally country on investor Managers and investors. protection is high, such as Canada. Voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance will be seen as 
something credibled efforts in improving governance. 
3 Kim and Market Liquidity and Volume around Expanded disclosure mitigates information 
Verrecchia, Earnings Announcements asymmetry between managers and investors. 
(1994) 
4 Verreccbia, Essays on Disclosure Declining of information asymmetry used as a tool to 
(2001) intewate market efficiency. 
Sources: earlier studies 
Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 
Disclosure is an effort to minimize the information asymmetry in the company. 
Through submission of relevant and credible informations (financial and non-financial) to 
all parties will expect that the quality of information held by management as an agent will 
equal or relatively equal (its quality and quantity) compared with the information held by 
other parties (including investors and creditors). so that the various parties will be assisted in 
terms of speed and accuracy during their decision-making process (Cormier at aI, 2008) and 
governance disclosure contributes in reducing the stock-market information asymmetry 
particularly in the country with legally high protection on investor such as Canada. 
24
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis - EKONOMIS. Vol. 9, Nomor 1, Maret 2015
Generally, disclosure is deemed entirely good and disclosure in large companies as 
part of efforts to reduce agency problems arise in the company. Indeed this opinion is not 
completely perfect, because at the better level of disclosure can also exacerbate the agency 
problem, this is because the costs incurred in the disclosure will also increase, including 
executive compensation and meeting expenses in connection with the disclosure. Further, 
pointed out that large companies will adopt strict disclosure rules than smaller firms, and 
firms with better disclosure would use a more capable power management (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2012). 
For more details, the relationships between variables can be seen in a form of matrix 
table that related to corporate governance, disclosure and information asynnnetry (see table 
2). Thus concluded that if companies carry out the principles and mechanisms of good 
corporate governance it will raise the level of disclosure (whether voluntary or mandatory) 
and will further decrease the information asynnnetry. In the direct relationship between 
corporate governance and information asynnnetry it says that companies that implement 
good corporate governance will mitigate information asynnnetry. Based on the above 
literatures theories this study constructed hypotheses as: 
I. Corporate governance structure has a significant impact on information asynnnetry in 
Indonesia banking industry. 
2. Corporate governance structure has a significant impact on disclosure in Indonesia 
banking industry. 
3. Disclosure has a significant impact on information asynnnetry in Indonesia banking 
industry. 
The Analysis 
There were 38 banks listed on the Jakarta stock exchange, during the the year of 
2001-2012, there were 17 new bank entry in the listing on the Jakarta stock exchange and 
after 31 December 2001 there were 6 banks delisted during the period. So there are 15 banks 
as sample in this study, with the years of research 200 I up to 2012 then there were 180 year 
observational datas. 
25
Information Asymmetry As The Impact Of Disclosure And Corporate Governance Structure  
Oleh : Jenny Sihombing
Outer Model Test (Measurement Model) 
The first step outer model test in figure 1 shown that the indicators managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership for variable corporate governance structure were not 
meet the validity criteria, also indicator volume for variabel information asymmetry were 
not meet the validity criteria, it was because of the entire loading factor for those indicators 
were below 0.7. By eliminating one by one indicator which does not meet the requirements 
(from the smallest and so on), then we obtained the fmal model that deserve to be continued 
(as it is in figure 2), where that the entire loading factor for each variable has been greater 
than 0.7. 
Figure 1 
First Step Outer Model Test 
Source: PLS figure output 
Figure 2 has shown that there are two reflective indicators for variable corporate 
governance deserve to be further processed (ie indicator of the audit committee member and 
independent commissioner), while for information asymmetry variable represented by the 
indicator of bid ask spread, and for disclosure variable were represented by IPeG indicators 
(total score of items disclosed by the company / the maximum score that should be disclosed 
by the company). 
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Figure 2 
Last Step Outer Model Test 
172 
Corp Gov ... Int Asymm .. 
Source: PLS figure output 
With the value of average variance extracted and Cronbachs Alpha were> 0.5 (see 
also table 3) confirmed that the model was eligible to be processed further for statistical 
hypothesis testing. The value of R square are 0.024543 and 0.031944 repectively for 
disclosure and information asymmetry that implied the model was weak:. 
AVE 
Corp. Governance 0.755656 
Disclosure 1.000000 
Inf. Asymmetry 1.000000 
Source: statistical PLS output 
Inner Model Test (Path Model) 
Table 3 
Overview Result 
Composite 
Reliability 
0.860504 
1.000000 
1.000000 
R Square Cronbachs Alpha 
0.684261 
0.024543 1.000000 
0.031944 1.000000 
This hypothesis testing using significance level (n) of 10% and based on the rule of 
thumb inner evaluation models that the correlational between variables will be declared 
significant if the t-statistics > 1.65 (Latan and Ghozali 2012). Path testing models with PLS 
approach resulted that only two hypotheses were accepted, namely: 
27
Information Asymmetry As The Impact Of Disclosure And Corporate Governance Structure  
Oleh : Jenny Sihombing
Hypothesis 2 -+ Corporate governance structure has a significant impact on disclosure in 
Indonesia banking industry (corporate governance structure represented by 
the indicator of audit committee member and independen board 
commissioner) 
Hypothesis 3 -+ Disclosure has a significant impact on information asymmetry In 
Indonesia banking industry (disclosure represented by the indicator of 
percentage corporate governance items disclosed or as IPCG). 
Corp 
Governance 
-> 
Disclosure 
Corp 
Governance 
-> Inf 
Asymmetry 
Disclosure -
>Inf 
Asymmetry 
Figure 3 
Inner Model Test 
Source: PLS figure output 
Table 4 
Path Coefficients (Mean, STDEV, T -Values) 
Original Sample Standard Standard T Statistics Sample Mean(M) Deviation Error (IO/STERRI) (0) (STDEV) (STERR) 
0.156661 0.171066 0.083336 0.083336 1.879874 
0.027953 0.032643 0.103585 0.103585 0.269859 
0.172205 0.168036 0.100585 0.100585 1.712034 
Source: statistical PLS output 
Hypotesis 
(Accepted! Rejected) 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
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Conclusion and Management Interpretation 
The transfer of authority from principals to executives through the board for the 
provision of trust management of funds that have been invested in the enterprise is a form of 
agency theory, and this theory even thrive in the company formed in the relationship 
between the various parties. On that authorization relationship may potentially the 
emergence of agency problems, so that the information held by the agent and the principal 
can be different at levels and quality, that condition known as information asymmetry. That 
is why we need good corporate governance that will reduce such problem, the 
implementation of the principles and mechanisms of good corporate governance can raise 
the level of disclosure and will further decrease the information asymmetry. 
The study results showed that the application of corporate governance in Indonesia 
banking industry has a significant impact on the level of disclosure, in this study corporate 
governance reflected by independent of board commissioner and the audit committee 
member or size. The sufficient information disclosure in Indonesian banking industry is 
very important to provide gnarantees for the investors and creditors that every money they 
put in the bank is safe and deliver the expected returns. The role of independent board 
commissioner to oversight or control and to run their advisory function became very 
determinant point, independent commissioner board that exercises their role and function 
will encourage and increase the level of good corporate governance disclosure (Zaluki and 
Russin, 2009; Richard and Raniffa, 2008). 
The audit committee roles to review and evaluate financial statements periodically 
based on the rules and principles applicable accounting, assessing the implementation and 
results of the audit, as well as dealing with internal control and corporate governance 
implementaion, directing the implementation of transparency and good disclosure practices. 
This study implies the size of audit committee in Indonesia banking became important in 
enhancing or to deliver the implementation of transparency and to the level of good 
disclosure practices (Susiyani, 2009). 
Disclosure has a significant impact to minimize information asymmetry in 
Indonesia banking, submission of relevant and credible information from management to 
stakeholders will deliver the quality of information available to other parties (including 
investors and creditors) so that the various parties may be assisted in their decision-making 
process (Cormier et al, 2008; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
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